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A PROPOSED "BEST INTERESTS" TEST
FOR REMOVING A CHILD FROM THE
JURISDICTION OF THE NONCUSTODIAL PARENT
INTRODUCTION

Awards of child custody are generally accompanied by a visitation
provision for the noncustodial parent. 1 Visitation may be curtailed,
however, and even extinguished, when the custodial parent proposes
to move with the child to another jurisdiction.2 Recognizing that the
1. Typically, the custodial parent is the mother. H. Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States §17.4, at 590 (1968); Doudna, The Weekend
Mother, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1982, § 6 (Magazine), at 72, col. 5. While recognizing
the prevalence of custody awards to mothers, this Note also recognizes the emerging
phenomenon of mothers without custody. See Doudna, supra, at 75, 84 (discussing
instances in which mothers involuntarily lost custody of children); Manuel, Mothers
without custody: a painful decision, Christian Sci. Monitor, Sept. 13, 1982, at 18,
col. 3 (discussing consequences experienced by mother who voluntarily relinquished
court-ordered custody). Thus, unlike other commentary, which use the terms "noncustodial father" and "custodial mother" to mirror the typical alignment of parties in
custody matters, this Note adopts the more general terms "noncustodial parent" and
"custodial parent," unless the context requires an identification of the gender of the
parent.
2. Because of career opportunities, the greater ease with which mobility can be
achieved in modern society, see infra note 24, and the obligations that a remarriage
may entail, see, e.g., Clark v. Clark, 46 Ala. App. 432, 434, 243 So. 2d 517, 518
(Civ. App. 1970) (second husband stationed in Germany with military); In re Marriage of Feliciano, 103 Ill. App. 3d 666, 668, 431 N.E.2d 1120, 1122 (1981) (second
husband secured employment in Tennessee as truck driver); Cmaylo v. Cmaylo, 76
A.D.2d 898, 898-99, 429 N.Y.S.2d 44, 45 (second husband involuntarily transferred
to Texas by employer), appeal dismissed, 51 N.Y.2d 770 (1980); Burich v. Burich,
314 N.W.2d 82, 88 (N.D. 1981) (second husband moved to Kansas to pursue work in
oil business); Culberson v. Culberson, 60 Ohio App. 2d 304, 305, 397 N.E.2d 1226,
1227 (1978) (per curiam) (second husband assigned to military post in Germany), the
custodial parent is not always satisfied to remain in the jurisdiction of the noncustodial parent. See infra pt. I(B)(1).
The custodial parent's proposed relocation may be to a different locale within
the home state, see, e.g., Bernick v. Bernick, 31 Colo. App. 485, 486, 505 P.2d 14, 15
(1972); Dean v. Dean, 79 A.D.2d 876, 876, 436 N.Y.S.2d 1019, 1019 (1980), to
another state, see, e.g., Middlekauff v. Middlekauff, 161 N.J. Super. 84, 86, 390
A.2d 1202, 1203 (App. Div. 1978); Fritschler v. Fritschler, 60 Wis. 2d 283, 285, 208
N.W.2d 336, 338 (1973), or to a foreign country. Daghir v. Daghir, 82 A.D.2d 191,
192, 441 N.Y.S.2d 494, 495 (1981), aff'd, 56 N.Y.2d 938, 439 N.E.2d 324, 453
N.Y.S.2d 609 (1982); In re Marriage of Ditto, 52 Or. App. 609, 611, 628 P.2d 777,
778 (1981). This Note avoids the term "removal from a state," and instead uses the
term "removal from a jurisdiction," because the custodial parent can conceivably
propose to move the child to a point within the state so distant from the noncustodial
parent's residence as to frustrate frequent and regular visitation. But see Bernick v.
Bernick, 31 Colo. App. 485, 486, 505 P.2d 14, 15 (1972) (move of 140 miles to
another town in Colorado allowed); Dean v. Dean, 79 A.D.2d 876, 876, 436
N.Y.S.2d 1019, 1019 (1980) (move of some 400 miles within New York allowed).
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custodial parent's relocation might impair the opportunity to visit the
child, the noncustodial parent may oppose the move. 3 Whether a
court will then permit removal of the child from the jurisdiction
depends on its determination of the "best interests" of the child. 4
This Note argues that a child's best interests are safeguarded only if
the custodial parent is required to satisfy a heavy evidentiary burden. 5 After examining the right of visitation and its exercise when the
3. See infra pt. I(B)(2).
4. See H. Clark, supra note 1, § 17.4, at 587 (interference with right of visitation is small price to pay for welfare of child if his welfare would be augmented by
removal); cf. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face
of Indeterminacy, 39 Law & Contemp. Probs. 226, 255 (Summer 1975) (in resolving
custody dispute, judge must choose alternative that "maximizes" what is best for
particular child). Courts have not specifically defined the term "best interests" in the
context of removal. See, e.g., Tanttila v. Tanttila, 152 Colo. 445, 453, 382 P.2d 798,
802 (1963) (McWilliams, J., dissenting); Hale v. Hale, 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh.
2117, 2120-21, 429 N.E.2d 340, 343 (1981); In re Marriage of Meier, 286 Or. 437,
447, 595 P.2d 474, 479 (1979); cf. Comment, Alternatives to "ParentalRight" in
Child Custody Disputes Involving Third Parties, 73 Yale L.J. 151, 153-54 (1963)
(speculating that in the field of custody adjudication the "best interests" standard
"may be unworkable or a mere cloak for the operation of judicial intuition") [hereinafter cited as Alternatives].
Some commentators have analyzed the issue, which is beyond the scope of this
Note, of removal in the context of the custodial parent's right to travel. E.g.,
Comment, Restrictions on a Parent's Right to Travel in Child Custody Cases: Possible ConstitutionalQuestions, 6 U.C.D. L. Rev. 181 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Right
to Travel]; Note, Residence Restrictions on Custodial Parents: Implicationsfor the
Right to Travel, 12 Rutgers L.J. 341 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Residence Restrictions]. These commentators argue that a state overcomes the constitutional challenge
only when circumstances indicate that removal would be harmful to the child. Right
to Travel, supra, at 191; Residence Restrictions, supra, at 360.
5. For example, the custodial parent as petitioner begins the process of proof by
producing evidence that the move would be in the best interests of the child. See G.
Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence § 15, at 43-44 (1978). After satisfying
this so-called "burden of production," the burden of producing evidence shifts to the
noncustodial parent, who then introduces evidence that the move would be detrimental to the best interests of the child. See id. at 45. If the trier of fact decides, after
both sides have been heard, that it is "more probable than not" that the proposed
move would be in the best interests of the child, see id. at 41, then the petitioning
custodial parent has met the "burden of persuasion," which that parent has carried
since the commencement of the proceeding. See id. Consequently, removal will be
permitted. Possibly, after all the evidence has been introduced, the child's best
interests will appear to be served as well by continued residency in the jurisdiction as
by removal. If the evidence is in this state of equipoise, the petitioning custodial
parent has failed to satisfy the burden of persuasion, see id. at 47, and thus removal
must be prohibited. For a detailed analysis of the mechanics of evidentiary burdens,
see F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure §§ 7.5-.8 (2d ed. 1977); C. McCormick,
McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence §§ 336-339 (E. Cleary 2d rev. ed.
1972). The practice in the literature, which is to have the term "burden of proof"
encompass the terms "burden of production" and "burden of persuasion," is not
followed here because clarity of expression dictates that the two burdens be isolated
from each other.
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divorced parents continue to live in the same jurisdiction, Part I
explores the custodial parent's possible reasons for relocation, the
noncustodial parent's interest in preventing it, and the effect that
relocation may have on the child's relationship with the noncustodial
parent. With this background, Part II assesses the tests that appellate
courts in four states have devised for use in removal cases. 6 Finally,
Part III sets forth certain modifications of the New York "exceptional
circumstances" test to arrive at a model test to assist trial judges in
removal determinations.
I.

THE RIGHT OF VISITATION AND THE IMPLICATIONS
OF REMOVAL

A. Visitation
Visitation is crucial to the psychological well-being of a child because it allows him to continue to receive the love and support of the
noncustodial parent. 7 Accordingly, courts tend to equate visitation
6. While courts typically apply the "best interests" standard to removal determinations, see infra text accompanying notes 53-55, an analysis of the case law since
1956 reveals that only seven states have adopted what may be characterized as
removal tests-that is, tests providing an analytical framework within which such
determinations can be made. Of these seven states, only four-New York, New
Jersey, Illinois and Colorado-have developed tests to a point such that they are
sufficiently representative of the spectrum of approaches to removal determinations.
See infra pt. II. Each of the tests of the other three states-California, Massachusetts
and Minnesota-bears a strong resemblance to a test of one of the four major states,
and therefore none is discussed extensively herein. See Dozier v. Dozier, 167 Cal.
App. 2d 714, 719, 334 P.2d 957, 961 (1959) (court's consideration of "real financial,
employment, educational, health, or housing" factors, resembling New York's "exceptional circumstances" test); Hale v. Hale, 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 2117,
2122, 429 N.E.2d 340, 343 (1981) (court noting its state's lack of removal test, and
turning for guidance to New Jersey's removal test); Smith v. Smith, 282 Minn. 190,
195, 163 N.W.2d 852, 857 (1968) (court's consideration of "[u]nusual circumstances
which alone or in combination with other facts may justify . . . an unconsented-to
removal," resembling New York's "exceptional circumstances" test).
7. E.g., Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 175, 418 N.E.2d 377, 380, 436
N.Y.S.2d 862, 865 (1981) (fact that custody is placed in one parent does not necessarily terminate role of other as "psychological guardian and preceptor"); Daghir v.
Daghir, 82 A.D.2d 191, 194, 441 N.Y.S.2d 494, 496 (1981) (visitation allows noncustodial parent to "provide [the] child with the guidance and counsel youngsters
require in their formative years . . . [and to] be an available source of comfort and
solace in times of [the] child's need"), ajf'd, 56 N.Y.2d 938, 439 N.E.2d 324, 453
N.Y.S.2d 609 (1982); Comment, Post-Divorce Visitation:A Study in the Deprivation
of Rights, 27 De Paul L. Rev. 113, 123 (1977) ("The support, interest and continuing
love of the absent parent is vital to the psychological well-being of the child.")
[hereinafter cited as Post-Divorce Visitation]; Note, The CaliforniaCustody Decree,
13 Stan. L. Rev. 108, 114 (1960) (contact with both parents is desirable for child's
emotional growth, and identification with both parents is essential in evolving mature conscience in child) [hereinafter cited as California Custody]. Visitation often
helps relieve the child of the feeling of abandonment that may haunt him after a
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with the best interests of the child.8 In fact, courts so vigilantly
protect the continuing association of the noncustodial parent and the

divorce. Bruch, Making Visitation Work: Dual ParentingOrders-New Perspectives
on the Traditional Tug-of-War, Fam. Advoc. 22, 26 (Summer 1978); see McManus
v. McManus, 38 Ill. App. 3d 645, 647, 348 N.E.2d 507, 509 (1976) (liberal visitation
given to noncustodial parent so that child will not become estranged from that
parent); Post-Divorce Visitation, supra, at 114 (welfare of child requires liberal
visitation so that he will not become estranged from noncustodial parent); Residence
Restrictions, supra note 4, at 359 ("[A]lternative arrangements in lieu of weekly visits
may involve a significant loosening of family ties.").
8. E.g., Hailey v. Hailey, 513 P.2d 473, 474 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973); McManus
v. McManus, 38 Ill. App. 3d 645, 647, 348 N.E.2d 507, 509 (1976); Donovan v.
Donovan, 212 N.W.2d 451, 453 (Iowa 1973); Burich v. Burich, 314 N.W.2d 82, 86
(N.D. 1981); Henszey, Visitation by a Non-Custodial Parent: What is the "Best
Interest" Doctrine?, 15 J. Fam. L. 213, 214 (1976-1977); Post-Divorce Visitation,
supra note 7, at 114. Courts can grant three possible types of visitation awards. They
are: 1) "reasonable" visitation, in which the divorced parents arrange the timing of
the visitation between themselves; 2) specified visitation, which designates the dates,
times and places for visitation; and 3) visitation that is left to the discretion of the
custodial parent. Post-Divorce Visitation, supra note 7, at 115. Both "reasonable"
and specified visitation have their drawbacks. The indefiniteness inherent in "reasonable" visitation awards leaves room for a custodial parent to be uncooperative.
Similarly, the inflexibility of specified visitation awards hinders the parents' ability to
adjust visitation schedules as the need arises. See California Custody, supra note 7, at
113. The value of an award of specified visitation, however, is its resolution of a
potentially recurring dispute between the parents. Johnson, Visitation: When Access
Becomes Excess, Fam. Advoc. 14, 16 (Summer 1978). Such an arrangement becomes
a necessity if the divorced parents are unable to resolve matters of visitation between
themselves. See Post-Divorce Visitation, supra note 7, at 115. For illustrations of
specified and "reasonable" visitation awards, see Johnson, supra, at 15-17.
The view that visitation should be left to the discretion of the custodial parent
has not yet been adopted by the courts, Post-DivorceVisitation, supra note 7, at 115;
see, e.g., Burich v. Burich, 314 N.W.2d 82, 86-87 (N.D. 1981) (commenting on
discussion of importance of visitation to child in Gardebring v. Rizzo, 269 N.W.2d
104, 110 (N.D. 1978)), but has been advocated in a noted psychological study of the
children of divorced parents. J. Goldstein, A. Freud & A. Solnit, Beyond the Best
Interests of the Child (1973). The authors of that work conclude that to protect the
ongoing relationship between the custodial parent and the child, "the noncustodial
parent should have no legally enforceable right to visit the child, and the custodial
parent should have the right to decide whether it is desirable for the child to have
such visits." Id. at 38. This position was criticized by a reviewer as encouraging
spiteful behavior, blackmail and extortion by the custodial parent. Foster, Book
Review, 12 Willamette L.J. 545, 551 (1976). In only recognizing the value of the
relationship between the child and the custodial parent, it ignores the child's need for
a continuing association with the noncustodial parent. Post-Divorce Visitation, supra
note 7, at 116.
The view that post-divorce visitation serves the best interests of the child is
generally consistent with sociological studies. See, e.g., J. Despert, Children of
Divorce 69-73 (1953); J. Wallerstein & J. Kelly, Surviving the Breakup 123, 131, 315
(1980). It has even been raised to the level of public policy by state courts that
encourage the maintenance of close interfamily relationships in post-divorce situations. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Murga, 103 Cal. App. 3d 498, 502-03, 163 Cal.
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child that interference with or frustration of visitation by the custodial
parent may prompt courts to transfer custody from that parent to the
other. 9
Notwithstanding the importance of visitation, the noncustodial parent's right to exercise it is not absolute.' 0 Decisions relative to visitation must serve the best interests of the child.I' Therefore, visitation
must be thought of "primarily [as the] right of the [child] and secondarily [as the] right of the non-custodial parent."' 12 The latter may
Rptr. 79, 80 (1980); Frail v. Frail, 54 Ill. App. 3d 1013, 1015, 370 N.E.2d 303, 304
(1977); Entwistle v. Entwistle, 61 A.D.2d 380, 384-85, 402 N.Y.S.2d 213, 216,
appeal dismissed, 44 N.Y.2d 851 (1978); Commonwealth ex rel. Lotz v. Lotz, 188
Pa. Super. 241, 244, 146 A.2d 362, 363-64 (1958), aff'd per curiam, 396 Pa. 287, 152
A.2d 663 (1959). Because visitation is deemed so important to the welfare of the
child, it is generally granted to the noncustodial parent by the courts as a matter of
course. Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 175, 418 N.E.2d 377, 380, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862,
865 (1981); H. Clark, supra note 1, § 17.4, at 590; see Post-Divorce Visitation, supra
note 7, at 123. The preservation of visitation rights, which are generally considered
basic natural rights, is not conditioned on their being set out in a separation agreement or decree of divorce. Strahl v. Strahl, 66 A.D.2d 571, 576, 414 N.Y.S.2d 184,
187 (1979), affd, 49 N.Y.2d 1036, 407 N.E.2d 479, 429 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1980);
Denberg v. Denberg, 34 Misc. 2d 980, 985-86, 229 N.Y.S.2d 831, 837 (Sup. Ct.
1962); Comment, Article 4639a-Custody, Support and Visitation Re: Suits to Have
These Rights Changed, Modified or Enforced, 22 Baylor L. Rev. 497, 497 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Custody, Support & Visitation]; CaliforniaCustody, supra note
7, at 113; see 2 W. Nelson, Nelson on Divorce and Annulment with Selected Forms
§ 15.26, at 274-75 (2d ed. 1961). In the absence of a provision on visitation, the
noncustodial parent may visit the child at reasonable times and places. Custody,
Support & Visitation, supra, at 497.
9. See, e.g., Pelts v. Pelts, 425 S.W.2d 269, 270 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968); Daghir v.
Daghir, 82 A.D.2d 191, 196, 441 N.Y.S.2d 494, 497 (1981), aff'd, 56 N.Y.2d 938, 439
N.E.2d 324, 453 N.Y.S.2d 609 (1982); In re Marriage of Meier, 286 Or. 437, 441-42,
595 P.2d 474, 476 (1979); Wood v. Wood, 510 S.W.2d 399, 400 (Tex. Civ. App.
1974); Fritschler v. Fritschler, 60 Wis. 2d 283, 285, 290, 208 N.W.2d 336, 337, 33940 (1973).
10. Raymond v. Raymond, 165 Conn. 735, 741, 345 A.2d 48, 52 (1974); Krause
v. Krause, 58 Wis. 2d 499, 512, 206 N.W.2d 589, 596 (1973); see In re Marriage of
Lower, 269 N.W.2d 822, 827 (Iowa 1978) (en bane); Hutchins v. Hutchins, 84 Mich.
App. 236, 239, 269 N.W.2d 539, 540 (1978); 2 W. Nelson, supra note 8, § 15.26, at
274-75. One commentator states that the so-called parental visitation right or privilege is no more than a claim because visitation will be denied if it promises to be
detrimental to the child's best interests. Henszey, supra note 8, at 214; cf. Salaices v.
Sabraw, 400 F. Supp. 367 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (raising but not deciding issue of whether
children have constitutional right not to visit noncustodial parent), remanded mem.,
571 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1978). See infra note 13 and accompanying text.
11. Bernick v. Bernick, 31 Colo. App. 485, 487, 505 P.2d 14, 15 (1972); accord
In re Marriage of Lower, 269 N.W.2d 822, 827 (Iowa 1978) (en banc); Weiss v.
Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 174-75, 418 N.E.2d 377, 379-80, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862, 865
(1981); Fritschler v. Fritschler, 60 Wis. 2d 283, 289, 208 N.W.2d 336, 339 (1973).
12. Bernick v. Bernick, 31 Colo. App. 485, 487, 505 P.2d 14, 15 (1972); see In re
Marriage of Lower, 269 N.W.2d 822, 827 (Iowa 1978) (en banc) (noncustodial
parent's visitation rights are derivative from child's best interests).
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forfeit the right by conduct, or may be deprived of it if its exercise
would be harmful to the child's welfare.13
To provide a positive experience for the child, visitation must be
frequent and regular. 1 4 When the child and noncustodial parent live
close to each other, courts have generally allowed such visitation in
order to maintain the child's relationship with that parent.' 5 Even
when the parties arrange the dates, times and places of visitation

13. Strahl v. Strahl, 66 A.D.2d 571, 574, 414 N.Y.S.2d 184, 186 (1979), aff'd, 49
N.Y.2d 1036, 407 N.E.2d 479, 429 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1980); 2 W. Nelson, supra note 8,
§ 15.26, at 275. For a detailed discussion of circumstances under which visitation
may be denied, see Post-Divorce Visitation, supra note 7, at 116-23. The noncustodial parent's failure to take full advantage of visitation rights does not constitute a
forfeiture. See Strahl v. Strahl, 66 A.D.2d 571, 577, 414 N.Y.S.2d 184, 187 (1979)
(test is whether noncustodial parent has "sincere desire to be in the company of the
children and has had a close, continuous and meaningful association with them over
a significant period of time"), aff'd, 49 N.Y.2d 1036, 407 N.E.2d 479, 429 N.Y.S.2d
635 (1980).
14. Daghir v. Daghir, 82 A.D.2d 191, 194, 441 N.Y.S.2d 494, 496 (1981), aff'd,
56 N.Y.2d 938, 439 N.E.2d 324, 453 N.Y.S.2d 609 (1982); see In re Marriage of
Murga, 103 Cal. App. 3d 498, 502-03, 163 Cal. Rptr. 79, 80 (1980); Felton v. Felton,
1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 779, 781, 418 N.E.2d 606, 607 (1981); Martinez v. Konczewski,
85 A.D.2d 717, 717, 445 N.Y.S.2d 844, 845 (1981); Fritschler v. Fritschler, 60 Wis.
2d 283, 289, 208 N.W.2d 336, 339 (1973); Balbirer, Rights and Obligations of
Custodial and Non-custodial Parentsin Connecticut, 53 Conn. B.J. 356, 364 (1979);
Bruch, supra note 7, at 26.
15. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Murga, 103 Cal. App. 3d 498, 501, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 79, 79 (1980) (decreed visitation on alternate weekends, specified holidays, one
week each summer and one week prior to Christmas Eve); In re Marriage of Lower,
269 N.W.2d 822, 823 (Iowa 1978) (en banc) (decreed visitation on alternate weekends and several weeks in summer); D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200,
206, 365 A.2d 27, 30 (Ch. Div.) (court noting generally held view that some variation
of weekly visitation is most consistent with maintaining parental relationship), aJf'd
per curiam, 144 N.J. Super. 352, 365 A.2d 716 (App. Div. 1976); Weiss v. Weiss, 52
N.Y.2d 170, 173, 418 N.E.2d 377, 378-79, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862, 864 (1981) (decreed
visitation of one weekday afternoon each week, alternate weekends, alternate Easter
and Christmas holidays and two continuous weeks during summer); In re Marriage
of Meier, 286 Or. 437, 439, 595 P.2d 474, 475 (1979) (decreed visitation of alternate
weekends, one weekday evening during intervening weeks, three weeks during summer and reasonable sharing of holidays); Whitman v. Whitman, 28 Wis. 2d 50, 52,
135 N.W.2d 835, 836 (1965) (decreed visitation of one visit per week upon 24 hours
notice, at least two days during Christmas holidays and one month during summer);
H. Clark, supra note 1, § 17.4(g), at 590 (noting common practice of courts to allow
noncustodial parent to have child on weekends and during school vacations); cf.
Jenkins v. Jenkins, 395 So. 2d 1045, 1046 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981) (decree allowing
liberal visitation); Scheiner v. Scheiner, 336 So. 2d 406, 407 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1976) (decree of liberal visitation at reasonable times and places after reasonable
notice); Jafari v. Jafari, 204 Neb. 622, 623, 284 N.W.2d 554, 555 (1979) (decree
allowing liberal visitation); Weber v. Weber, 84 A.D.2d 940, 940, 446 N.Y.S.2d 676,
676 (1981) (same).
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pursuant to a decree of "reasonable" visitation,' 6 they often settle on a
weekly arrangement.' 7 Alternative arrangements in lieu of weekly
visitation may aggravate an already difficult situation occasioned by
the divorce'8 and result in the estrangement of the child from the
noncustodial parent and the loss of that parent's guiding role in the
child's life. 9
B. Removal
With increasing frequency, custodial parents wish to move with
their children from the jurisdiction of the noncustodial parent.2 0 The
crux of the conflict that usually arises between the divorced parents is
aptly posited by one commentator:
There is no more effective way of preventing a non-custodial [parent] from seeing his child than to remove it to a distant point. Of
what practical use to a [noncustodial parent] are his visitation
rights . . .if he has to go hundreds, if not thousands, of miles to

exercise them? On the other hand, would it not be unconscionable
if the custodial [parent], to preserve the [other's] rights, was tethplace permanently, regardless of legitimate imperatives
ered to one
2
to move? '
The resolution of the parents' competing interests 22 depends upon a
of the child to another jurisdiction
determination of whether removal
23
will promote his best interests.
16. See Post-Divorce Visitation, supra note 7, at 115 (under "reasonable" visitation award, divorced parents schedule visitation periods "to their mutual convenience"). But see California Custody, supra note 7, at 113 (defining "reasonable"
visitation as right to see child at all times convenient to custodial parent).
17. See, e.g., Clark v. Clark, 46 Ala. App. 432, 433-34, 243 So. 2d 517, 518 (Civ.
App. 1970); In re Marriage of Szamocki, 47 Cal. App. 3d 812, 814, 121 Cal. Rptr.
231, 232 (1975); Gray v. Gray, 57 Ill. App. 3d 1, 2-3, 372 N.E.2d 909, 910-11
(1978); D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200, 203, 206, 365 A.2d 27, 28, 30
(Ch. Div.), aff'd per curiam, 144 N.J. Super. 352, 365 A.2d 716 (App. Div. 1976).
18. See Residence Restrictions, supra note 4, at 359.
19. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
20. See In re Marriage of Lower, 269 N.W.2d 822, 826 (Iowa 1978) (en bane);
Pattison v. Pattison,-208 So. 2d 395, 396 (La. Ct. App. 1968); Nedrow v. Nedrow, 48
Wash. 2d 243, 249, 292 P.2d 872, 875 (1956); Balbirer, supra note 14, at 364;
Bodenheimer, Equal Rights, Visitation, and the Right to Move, Fam. Advoc. 18, 20
(Summer 1978). See infra text accompanying notes 24-30 for a discussion of the
various factors that may bear on a custodial parent's decision to relocate.
21. 1 A. Lindey, Separation Agreements and Ante-Nuptial Contracts § 14, at 1481 (rev. ed. 1982).
22. Courts have been subject to the criticism that, in determining the welfare of
the child, they give too much weight to the competing rights and interests of the
parents. See Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 174-75, 418 N.E.2d 377, 379-80, 436
N.Y.S.2d 862, 865 (1981); Whitman v. Whitman, 28 Wis. 2d 50, 63-64, 135 N.W.2d
835, 842 (1965) (Hallows, J., dissenting); Drinan, The Rights of Children in Modern
American Family Law, 2 J. Fam. L. 101, 105, 109 (1962). The fact is, however, that
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1. The Custodial Parent's Interest in Removal
The custodial parent may wish to move 24 in order to search for
employment 2 5 or to begin a job already obtained.2 6 If remarried, he
or she would ordinarily like to accompany the second spouse when the
latter's employment requires a move to another jurisdiction. 27 A
proposed move may be to a location closer to the custodial parent's
own family, which may provide the parent with psychological security and assist in the upbringing of the child.28 Health 29 or educa-

the rights of the child cannot be exercised independently of his parents. Id. at 105; see
Whitman v. Whitman, 28 Wis. 2d 50, 64, 135 N.W.2d 835, 842 (1965) (Hallows, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he law has not yet developed to the point where the rights of the
children of divorces are recognized independently from those of the parents.").
Nevertheless, the child's best interests require "that the interest[s] of others be realized." See Sayre, Awarding Custody of Children, 9 U. Chi. L. Rev. 672, 684 (1942).
See infra pt. II(A)-(D) and accompanying text.
23. See Hale v. Hale, 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 2117, 2120, 429 N.E.2d 340,
342-43 (1981); Burich v. Burich, 314 N.W.2d 82, 85 (N.D. 1981); In re Marriage of
Meier, 286 Or. 437, 445-46, 595 P.2d 474, 478 (1979); Fritschler v. Fritschler, 60
Wis. 2d 283, 287, 208 N.W.2d 336, 338 (1973). While some states have statutes that
are to be applied to removal determinations, e.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 40, § 609
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-1983); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 208, § 30 (Michie/Law. Coop. 1981), the variation in the case law "is more dependent on the factors considered
important by the court than on the wording of the relevant statute, if any." Hale v.
Hale, 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 2117, 2122 n.7, 429 N.E.2d 340, 34Q n.7 (1981).
24. Some courts have taken notice of the easy mobility in today's society and the
consequent impracticality of confining a custodial parent to a limited geographical
area. Pattison v. Pattison, 208 So. 2d 395, 396 (La. Ct. App. 1968), cited with
approval in In re Marriage of Lower, 269 N.W.2d 822, 826 (Iowa 1978) (en banc);
see Gray v. Gray, 57 Ill. App. 3d 1, 6, 372 N.E.2d 909, 913 (1978).
The discussion in this Note presumes that the custodial parent's reasons for
wanting to move are legitimate. Removal will be denied in those cases in which the
reasons for relocation are proven to be vindictive. See Henszey, supra note 8, at 221.
25. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Young, 529 P.2d 344, 345 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974);
Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 173, 418 N.E.2d 377, 379, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862, 864
(1981); Lebowitz v. Lebowitz, 403 S.W.2d 871, 876 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966); Fritschler v. Fritschler, 60 Wis. 2d 283, 287, 208 N.W.2d 336, 338 (1973).
26. See, e.g., Gray v. Gray, 57 Ill. App. 3d 1, 3, 372 N.E.2d 909, 911 (1978);
Broomfield v. Broomfield, 283 So. 2d 839, 840 (La. Ct. App. 1973); D'Onofrio v.
D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200, 209-10, 365 A.2d 27, 31-32 (Ch. Div.), aff'd per
curiam, 144 N.J. Super. 352, 365 A.2d 716 (App. Div. 1976); Priebe v. Priebe, 81
A.D.2d 746, 747, 438 N.Y.S.2d 413, 414 (1981), aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 997, 434 N.E.2d
708, 449 N.Y.S.2d 472 (1982).
27. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Feliciano, 103 Ill. App. 3d 666, 667-68, 431
N.E.2d 1120, 1122 (1981); Cmaylo v. Cmaylo, 76 A.D.2d 898, 898-99, 429 N.Y.S.2d
44, 45, appeal dismissed, 51 N.Y.2d 770 (1980); Burich v. Burich, 314 N.W.2d 82, 87
(N.D. 1981); In re Marriage of Ditto, 52 Or. App. 609, 613-14, 628 P.2d 777, 779
(1981).
28. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Young, 529 P.2d 344, 345 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974);
D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200, 210, 365 A.2d 27, 32 (Ch. Div.), af-'d

1982]

"BEST INTERESTS" TEST IN REMOVAL CASES

497

tional3 ° considerations of either the custodial parent or the child may
constitute yet other cogent reasons for relocation.
Assuming there is no statute to the contrary and the divorce decree
does not contain a residence restriction, the custodial parent is not
required to obtain court approval to remove the child from the jurisdiction, 3 ' even though the relocation may interfere with previously
decreed visitation rights. 32 When the decree does contain a residence
restriction, which is sometimes included to ensure compliance with
the visitation arrangement that the court has ordered, 33 its provisions
generally require that the custodial parent obtain either the permission of the court or that of the other parent prior to relocating with the

per curiam, 144 N.J. Super. 352, 365 A.2d 716 (App. Div. 1976); In re Marriage of
Meier, 286 Or. 437, 440, 595 P.2d 474, 476 (1979); Bolenbaugh v. Bolenbaugh, 89
S.D. 639, 642, 237 N.W.2d 12, 14 (1975).
29. Compare Tandy v. Tandy, 42 Ill. App. 3d 87, 90, 355 N.E.2d 585, 588
(1976) (child's health) and Nash v. Nash, 236 A.D. 89, 89, 258 N.Y.S. 313, 313 (1932)
(per curiam) (same), afJ'd, 261 N.Y. 579, 185 N.E. 746 (1933) with Sipos v. Sipos, 73
A.D.2d 1055, 1056, 425 N.Y.S.2d 414, 416 (1980) (custodial parent's health) and
Deutsch v. Deutsch, 53 A.D.2d 861, 862, 385 N.Y.S.2d 357, 357 (1976) (same).
30. See, e.g., Middlekauff v. Middlekauff, 161 N.J. Super. 84, 94, 390 A.2d
1202, 1207 (App. Div. 1978) (custodial parent's education); Weiss v. Weiss, 52
N.Y.2d 170, 177, 418 N.E.2d 377, 381, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862, 866 (1981) (custodial
parent's or child's education); Harris v. Harris, 57 Misc. 2d 672, 674, 293 N.Y.S.2d
592, 595 (Fam. Ct. 1968) (custodial parent's education); Bolenbaugh v. Bolenbaugh,
89 S.D. 639, 642, 237 N.W.2d 12, 14 (1975) (same). But cf. Gray v. Gray, 57 Ill.
App. 3d 1,5-6, 372 N.E.2d 909, 913 (1978) (lack of programs or facilities in other
jurisdiction comparable to those presently needed and enjoyed by child could provide
basis for denying removal).
31. See Inman v. Inman, 370 So. 2d 1037, 1039 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979); In re
Marriage of Lower, 269 N.W.2d 822, 825 (Iowa 1978) (en bane); In re Marriage of
Smith, 290 Or. 567, 571, 624 P.2d 114, 116 (1981); Ehrich v. Ehrich, 7 Wash. App.
275, 278, 499 P.2d 216, 218 (1972); H. Clark, supra note 1, § 17.4, at 587; 2 W.
Nelson, supra note 8, § 15.20, at 267. It has been suggested, however, that even in
the absence of a statute or residency clause, the party awarded custody should seek
leave of the court to take the child out of the jurisdiction, id.; see In re Marriage of
Szamocki, 47 Cal. App. 3d 812, 818, 121 Cal. Rptr. 231, 234 (1975); Ernst v. Ernst,
214 Cal. App. 2d 174, 179, 29 Cal. Rptr. 478, 481 (1963); In re Marriage of Lower,
269 N.W.2d 822, 825 (Iowa 1978) (en bane), as a matter of courtesy to the noncustodial parent whose visitation rights are bound to be adversely affected by the move.
See id.
32. See H. Clark, supra note 1, § 17.4, at 587. But see Sipos v. Sipos, 73 A.D.2d
1055, 1056, 425 N.Y.S.2d 414, 416 (1980) (custodial parent impliedly prohibited
under divorce decree from removing child and thereby rendering illusory noncustodial parent's visitation rights).
33. Foss v. Foss, 392 So. 2d 606, 608 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Strahl v. Strahl,
66 A.D.2d 571, 573, 414 N.Y.S.2d 184, 185 (1979), afd, 49 N.Y.2d 1036, 407
N.E.2d 479, 429 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1980); In re Marriage of Meier, 286 Or. 437, 440, 595
P.2d 474, 475 (1979).
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Failure to seek such permission may result in a contempt
child. 34 35
citation.
2. The Noncustodial Parent's Interest
in Preventing Removal
The noncustodial parent may try to prevent removal of the child
from the jurisdiction in order to maintain visitation rights presently
exercised under the divorce decree. 36 If no residence restriction ap34. A residence restriction is a clause in a separation agreement or divorce decree
that prohibits the custodial parent from removing the child from the jurisdiction
without the permission of the court or that of the noncustodial parent. See, e.g.,
Jenkins v. Jenkins, 395 So. 2d 1045, 1046 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981) (agreement of
parents); Carney v. Carney, 1 Kan. App. 2d 544, 544, 571 P.2d 56, 57 (1977) (court
approval); Ex parte Sandefer, 461 S.W.2d 193, 194 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970) (per
curiam) (either agreement of parents or court approval). The restriction may require
that the custodial parent give the other parent proper notice prior to seeking the
court's permission, see, e.g., In re Marriage of Meier, 286 Or. 437, 439, 595 P.2d
474, 475 (1979); Wash v. Menn, 588 S.W.2d 637, 638 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979), relieve
the custodial parent from seeking permission if the move outside of the jurisdiction
will not exceed a specified period of time, typically 30 days, see, e.g., Carney v.
Carney, 1 Kan. App. 2d 544, 544, 571 P.2d 56, 57 (1977), confine the custodial
parent to a particular locale within the state, see, e.g., Strahl v. Strahl, 66 A.D.2d
571, 573, 414 N.Y.S.2d 184, 185 (1979) (50-mile radius of New York City), afJ'd, 49
N.Y.2d 1036, 407 N.E.2d 479, 429 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1980), or apply to the noncustodial
parent as well. See, e.g., Ex parte Sandefer, 461 S.W.2d 193, 194 (Tex. Civ. App.
1970) (per curiam).
The custodial parent is free to petition the court to modify the residence restriction itself if the need to seek permission for removal is not desired. See, e.g., Jenkins
v. Jenkins, 395 So. 2d 1045, 1046 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981); Carney v. Carney, 1 Kan.
App. 2d 544, 544, 571 P.2d 56, 57 (1977); Christopher v. Christopher, 62 Wash. 2d
82, 84, 381 P.2d 115, 116 (1963); H. Clark, supra note 1, § 17.7, at 600. The court
that grants the divorce has continuing jurisdiction to modify the decree even if
jurisdiction is not reserved. Id. at 598; see Note, Committee Decision of Child
Custody Disputes and the Judicial Test of "Best Interests,'"73 Yale L.J. 1201, 1204
n. 16 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Child Custody Disputes]. The power of modification
is not diminished by the fact that the decree may have had incorporated into it a
contractual agreement between the parents relating to the various aspects of custody,
including residence of the child. H. Clark, supra note 1, § 17.7, at 598; see Child
Custody Disputes, supra, at 1204 n. 16. If the court allows removal, either under the
terms of the residence restriction or by modification, then visitation privileges are
ordinarily reduced. See infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. A court that has
jurisdiction to permit removal has jurisdiction to modify the visitation rights of the
noncustodial parent. See Note, The Best Interests of the Child in Custody Controversies Between Natural Parents: Interpretations and Trends, 18 Washburn L.J. 482,
484-85 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Interpretationsand Trends].
35. See Clark v. Clark, 46 Ala. App. 432, 436, 243 So. 2d 517, 521 (Civ. App.
1970); In re Marriage of Ditto, 52 Or. App. 609, 612-13, 628 P.2d 777, 779 (1981).
36. See, e.g., Bernick v. Bernick, 31 Colo. App. 485, 486, 505 P.2d 14, 15 (1972);
Scheiner v. Scheiner, 336 So. 2d 406, 407 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Weiss v. Weiss,
52 N.Y.2d 170, 172, 418 N.E.2d 377, 378, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862, 863 (1981); In re
Marriage of Meier, 286 Or. 437, 440, 595 P.2d 474, 475 (1979).
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pears in the decree, that parent may petition the court for a modification of the decree to prohibit removal.3 7 If the decree contains a
residence restriction, and the custodial parent requests judicial approval to remove the child from the jurisdiction, 3 the noncustodial
39 a change in custody 40 or otherwise
parent may seek injunctive relief,
4
'
attempt to block relocation.
If the court permits removal over the objection of the noncustodial
parent, the resulting greater distance between that parent and the
child may make the maintenance of frequent visitation "unjustifiably
upsetting and disruptive to the routine of the [child] ."42 The court,
therefore, in an effort to formulate a realistic visitation schedule, is
decree to provide for less frequent, allikely to revise the divorce
43
though regular, visitation.
37. See, e.g., Bernick v. Bernick, 31 Colo. App. 485, 486, 505 P.2d 14, 15 (1972);
Scheiner v. Scheiner, 336 So. 2d 406, 407 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); In re Marriage
of Lower, 269 N.W.2d 822, 825 (Iowa 1978) (en banc); Daghir v. Daghir, 82 A.D.2d
191, 192, 441 N.Y.S.2d 494, 495 (1981), aff'd, 56 N.Y.2d 938, 439 N.E.2d 324, 453
N.Y.S.2d 609 (1982); In re Marriage of Smith, 290 Or. 567, 571, 624 P.2d 114, 116
(1981).
38. See supra note 34.
39. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Meier, 286 Or. 437, 440, 595 P.2d 474, 475
(1979); Wash v. Menn, 588 S.W.2d 637, 638 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
40. See, e.g., Strahl v. Strahl, 66 A.D.2d 571, 573, 414 N.Y.S.2d 184, 185
(1979), aff'd, 49 N.Y.2d 1036, 407 N.E.2d 479, 429 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1980); Christopher v. Christopher, 62 Wash. 2d 82, 84, 381 P.2d 115, 116 (1963); Fritschler v.
Fritschler, 60 Wis. 2d 283, 285, 208 N.W.2d 336, 337 (1973).
41. The noncustodial parent is not limited to a single remedy, but may seek any
combination of appropriate remedies. See, e.g., Strahl v. Strahl, 66 A.D.2d 571, 573,
414 N.Y.S.2d 184, 185 (1979) (cross-motion for sole custody or, in the alternative, for
order conditioning custodial parent's retention of custody on remaining within geographical area prescribed by residence restriction), aff'd, 49 N.Y.2d 1036, 407
N.E.2d 479, 429 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1980); Fritschler v. Fritschler, 60 Wis. 2d 283, 285,
208 N.W.2d 336, 337 (1973) (cross-motion for transfer of custody and for order
temporarily restraining removal pending outcome of hearing). If the custodial parent
defies the provisions of a residence restriction, the other parent can institute contempt proceedings. See Entwistle v. Entwistle, 61 A.D.2d 380, 383, 402 N.Y.S.2d
213, 214, appeal dismissed, 44 N.Y.2d 851 (1978).
42. In re Marriage of Lower, 269 N.W.2d 822, 827 (Iowa 1978) (en banc)
(quoting Remsburg v. Remsburg, 180 N.W.2d 461, 463 (Iowa 1970)). In Lower the
court would not allow the child to make trips from Iowa to Minnesota on alternate
weekends to visit his father. Even if a noncustodial parent were able to travel from a
distant jurisdiction on a weekly basis to visit the child, the conditions under which
such visitation may occur would not make it beneficial to the child. See infra text
accompanying note 50 (noting unsuitability of transient lodgings as place for visitation). When removal to another jurisdiction would not make impractical frequent
and regular visitation, a court will not alter a visitation schedule. See Middlekauff v.
Middlekauff, 161 N.J. Super. 84, 96-97, 390 A.2d 1202, 1208-09 (App. Div. 1978).
43. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Lower, 269 N.W.2d 822, 827 (Iowa 1978) (en
banc); Hale v. Hale, 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 2117, 2125, 429 N.E.2d 340, 345
(1981); D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200, 207, 211-12, 365 A.2d 27, 30,
32-33 (Ch. Div.), aff'd per curiam, 144 N.J. Super. 352, 365 A.2d 716 (App. Div.
1976); Weber v. Weber, 84 A.D.2d 940, 940-41, 446 N.Y.S.2d 676, 677 (1981).
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3. The Effect of Removal on the Child
Substitute visitation schedules often do not adequately meet the
needs of a child. Subjectively, the infrequency of contact with the
noncustodial parent denies the child the benefits of that parent's
guidance and influence. 44 Alternative visitation arrangements may
also prove to be unworkable from certain objective standpoints. High
travel costs may drastically curtail the visitation allowed under a
modified schedule. 45 Even if support payments are decreased to help
cover travel expenses, 46 or if a portion of those expenses is borne by the
custodial parent, 47 such financial assistance does not compensate for
the fact that relocation deprives the48 child and noncustodial parent of
frequent contacts with each other.

44. See Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 176, 418 N.E.2d 377, 380-81, 436
N.Y.S.2d 862, 865-66 (1981); Daghir v. Daghir, 82 A.D.2d 191, 195, 441 N.Y.S.2d
494, 497 (1981), aff'd, 56 N.Y.2d 938, 439 N.E.2d 324, 453 N.Y.S.2d 609 (1982);
Fritschler v. Fritschler, 60 Wis. 2d 283, 289, 208 N.W.2d 336, 339 (1973); Residence
Restrictions, supra note 4, at 359. But see D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super.
200, 207, 365 A.2d 27, 30 (Ch. Div.) (speculating that alternative of longer but fewer
visits may better serve the parental relationship), aff'd per curiam, 144 N.J. Super.
352, 365 A.2d 716 (App. Div. 1976); cf. Mnookin, supra note 4, at 258 (no reliable
behavioral theory predicts impact of alternative custody arrangements on child).
45. See, e.g., Clark v. Clark, 46 Ala. App. 432, 436, 243 So. 2d 517, 520 (Civ.
App. 1970); Lucy K.H. v. Carl W.H., 415 A.2d 510, 515 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1979); In re
Marriage of Burgham, 86 Ill. App. 3d 341, 347, 408 N.E.2d 37, 41 (1980); Weiss v.
Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 176, 418 N.E.2d 377, 380, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862, 865-66 (1981);
Residence Restrictions, supra note 4, at 359.
46. See, e.g., Hale v. Hale, 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 2117, 2125, 429
N.E.2d 340, 345 (1981); Hutchins v. Hutchins, 84 Mich. App. 236, 240 n.3, 269
N.W.2d 539, 541 n.3 (1978) (Beasley, J., concurring); D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 144
N.J. Super. 200, 211-12, 365 A.2d 27, 33 (Ch. Div.), aff'd per curiam, 144 N.J.
Super. 352, 365 A.2d 716 (App. Div. 1976); Martinez v. Konczewski, 85 A.D.2d 717,
717, 445 N.Y.S.2d 844, 845 (1981); cf. Sipos v. Sipos, 73 A.D.2d 1055, 1056, 425
N.Y.S.2d 414, 416 (1980) (withholding of support payments to compensate for
failure of custodial parent to abide by decreed visitation arrangement).
47. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Lower, 269 N.W.2d 822, 827 (Iowa 1978) (en
banc); Broomfield v. Broomfield, 283 So. 2d 839, 840 (La. Ct. App. 1973); Burich v.
Burich, 314 N.W.2d 82, 87 (N.D. 1981); In re Marriage of Ditto, 52 Or. App. 609,
615, 628 P.2d 777, 780 (1981).
48. Balbirer, supra note 14, at 364. Courts often fail to recognize that notwithstanding the speed of modern air travel, Hutchins v. Hutchins, 84 Mich. App. 236,
240 n.3, 269 N.W.2d 539, 541 n.3 (1978) (Beasley, J., concurring); Todaro v.
Todaro, 76 A.D.2d 816, 817, 429 N.Y.S.2d 670, 672 (1980), and its affordability by
some noncustodial parents, Fritschler v. Fritschler, 60 Wis. 2d 283, 289, 208 N.W.2d
336, 339 (1973); Whitman v. Whitman, 28 Wis. 2d 50, 55, 58, 135 N.W.2d 835, 837,
839 (1965), infrequent visits under alternative arrangements do not enable the child
to develop a close relationship with the noncustodial parent. See Daghir v. Daghir,
82 A.D.2d 191, 194-95, 441 N.Y.S.2d 494, 496-97 (1981), afJ'd, 56 N.Y.2d 938, 439
N.E.2d 324, 453 N.Y.S.2d 609 (1982); Fritschler v. Fritschler, 60 Wis. 2d 283, 289,
208 N.W.2d 336, 339 (1973).
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In addition, travel for the purpose of accomplishing visitation does
not depend exclusively upon financial considerations. The noncustodial parent may discover that the blocks of time needed for making
long trips are unavailable because of employment-related commitments. 49 If remarried, that parent probably has time-consuming
obligations to the spouse and any children of the second marriage.
Moreover, when the noncustodial parent does visit the child, the
conditions under which the visit takes place may not be conducive to
the development of a close parental relationship. Most likely the
traveling parent will have to obtain lodging near the residence of the
custodial parent for the duration of the visit. Transient lodging does
not provide a sufficiently home-like environment in which a child can
feel comfortable while spending time with a parent whom he now sees
infrequently.50
Substitute visitation arrangements can conflict with the desires and
needs of the child as well. Summer school, work or camp may interfere with court-ordered visitation. 5' The noncustodial parent will
have to convince the child that their relationship is more important
than the 2child's desire to pursue these interests or to spend time with
friends.1
The importance of frequent and regular visitation and the inadequacies of substitute arrangements suggest that the custodial parent
should be required to satisfy a heavy evidentiary burden to justify the
child's removal from the jurisdiction and a consequent modification of
the visitation schedule.
II.

THE "BEST INTERESTS" TESTS IN REMOVAL CASES

The determination of whether to permit the removal of a child
53
from the jurisdiction is committed to the discretion of the trial court.
49. Strahl v. Strahl, 66 A.D.2d 571, 578, 414 N.Y.S.2d 184, 188 (1979), aff'd, 49
N.Y.2d 1036, 407 N.E.2d 479, 429 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1980); cf. Whitman v. Whitman,
28 Wis. 2d 50, 55, 58, 135 N.W.2d 835, 837, 839 (1965) (alternative visitation
arrangements would not unduly burden the noncustodial parent whose employment
and wealth allowed him time and wherewithal to travel).
50. See Martinez v. Konczewski, 85 A.D.2d 717, 719, 445 N.Y.S.2d 844, 847
(1981) (Lazer, J., dissenting). One court has held that the custodial parent is not
obligated to forfeit the right of privacy by making the custodial home available for
use by the visiting noncustodial parent unless circumstances, such as the child's
extreme youth or ill health, dictate that the custodial residence be used as the place of
visitation. Foss v. Foss, 392 So. 2d 606, 607 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
51. Johnson, supra note 8, at 17.
52. See Martinez v. Konczewski, 85 A.D.2d 717, 719, 445 N.Y.S.2d 844, 847
(1981) (Lazer, J., dissenting). One commentator has suggested that as the child grows
older and becomes more involved in outside activities, the burden of making arrangements with the noncustodial parent may have to be placed on the child. Johnson,
supra note 8, at 17.
53. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 395 So. 2d 1045, 1046 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981); Carney v.
Carney, 1 Kan. App. 2d 544, 544, 571 P.2d 56, 57 (1977); Hutchins v. Hutchins, 84
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In exercising its discretion, the court will assess a multitude of facts5 4
against one single standard-the "best interests" of the child.5 5 As in
all cases in which a court's discretion is broad, appellate review is
56
limited to the issue of abuse of discretion.
To help trial court judges manage the variety of facts in removal
determinations, and to assist appellate courts in reviewing more effectively such determinations, some courts have derived tests from the
"best interests" standard. The relative strictness of these tests is a
function of the evidentiary burdens 57 they place on the custodial
parent.
A. The New York "Exceptional Circumstances" Test
Stressing the significance of frequent and regular visitation between
the child and noncustodial parent, New York courts permit removal
only when "exceptional circumstances" are shown. 58 In the leading
case of Weiss v. Weiss, 59 a custodial mother sought to move to Las
Vegas with her child in the hope of "putting an interest in singing to
vocational advantage after a lapse of some 15 years." 60 To preserve
his weekly visitation privileges, the father commenced a proceeding to
enjoin the removal. The mother argued in part that the residency

Mich. App. 236, 238, 269 N.W.2d 539, 539 (1978); In re Marriage of Meier, 286 Or.
437, 445, 595 P.2d 474, 478 (1979); see Child Custody Disputes, supra note 34, at
1206.
54. For illustrations of how these various facts have been analyzed in the context
of removal tests, see infra sections (A)-(D) of this Part.
55. See, e.g., In re Custody of Arquilla, 85 Ill. App. 3d 1090, 1092, 407 N.E.2d
948, 949-50 (1980); Hart v. Hart, 539 S.W.2d 679, 682 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Burich
v. Burich, 314 N.W.2d 82, 85 (N.D. 1981); Fritschler v. Fritschler, 60 Wis. 2d 283,
287-88, 208 N.W.2d 336, 338-39 (1973); 2 W. Nelson, supra note 8, § 15.20, at 26566.
56. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 395 So. 2d 1045, 1046 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981); In re
Marriage of Young, 529 P.2d 344, 345 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974); Hutchins v. Hutchins,
84 Mich. App. 236, 238, 269 N.W.2d 539, 539 (1978); Jafari v. Jafari, 204 Neb. 622,
624-25, 284 N.W.2d 554, 555-56 (1979). In view of the breadth of the trial court's
discretion in removal cases, Foley v. Foley, 214 Cal. App. 2d 802, 808, 29 Cal. Rptr.
857, 861 (1963); see In re Marriage of Meier, 286 Or. 437, 446, 595 P.2d 474, 478-79
(1979), its decisions are difficult to overturn on appeal. Child Custody Disputes,
supra note 34, at 1206; see Mnookin, supra note 4, at 253-54.
57. See supra note 5.
58. Weber v. Weber, 84 A.D.2d 940, 940-41, 446 N.Y.S.2d 676, 677 (1981);
Daghir v. Daghir, 82 A.D.2d 191, 196, 441 N.Y.S.2d 494, 497 (1981), aff'd, 56
N.Y.2d 938, 439 N.E.2d 324, 453 N.Y.S.2d 609 (1982); see Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d
170, 176-77, 418 N.E.2d 377, 380-81, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862, 865-66 (1981); Martinez v.
Konczewski, 85 A.D.2d 717, 717, 445 N.Y.S.2d 844, 844-45 (1981).
59. 52 N.Y.2d 170, 418 N.E.2d 377, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1981).
60. Id. at 173, 418 N.E.2d at 379, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 864. The mother had not been
made a firm job offer. Id. at 177, 418 N.E.2d at 381, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 866. See supra
text accompanying notes 24-26.
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clause in the separation agreement, which was incorporated into the
divorce decree, enabled her to remove the child from the jurisdiction."' The trial court denied the father's application, 62 but the Apwith visitapellate Division reversed,6 3 holding that the interference
64
tion rights was not warranted by the circumstances.
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed.6 5 It characterized the
residency clause as a "boilerplate" provision functioning only to "memorialize" the separated status of the parents. 6 The court noted that
the clause made no reference to the child, and that its enforcement
would render meaningless the extensive and explicit visitation provisions of the divorce decree.6 7 Finally, the court concluded that the
benefits of frequent and regular visits outweighed the benefits of
occasional, but longer, visits. 8
The strict approach of Weiss conforms to that established by New
York's lower courts, which have insisted on a showing of "exceptional
circumstances" to justify removal.6 9 These courts have charted sev-

61. 52 N.Y.2d at 173, 418 N.E.2d at 379, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 864. The residency
clause provided that "the [h]usband and the [w]ife shall continue to live separate and
apart from each other and [that] each may reside from time to time at such place or
places of residence or abode as he or she shall respectively choose." Id. For a brief
discussion of the legal effect of the incorporation of a separation agreement into a
divorce decree, see supra note 34.
62. 52 N.Y.2d at 172, 418 N.E.2d at 378, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 863.
63. Weiss v. Weiss, 76 A.D.2d 863, 863-64, 428 N.Y.S.2d 506, 507 (1980), af-'d,
52 N.Y.2d 170, 418 N.E.2d 377, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1981).
64. Id. at 864, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 507.
65. 52 N.Y.2d at 174, 418 N.E.2d at 379, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 864.
66. Id.
67. Id. The decree provided for "visits [on] one weekday afternoon each week,
tvo-day visits every other weekend, alternating Easter and Christmas holiday seasons and two continuous weeks during the summer." Id. at 173, 418 N.E.2d at 37879, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 864. According to the court, the factual findings showed that the
father fully and regularly availed himself of his visitation opportunities, and that he
had a strong, positive relationship with his son. Id. at 173, 418 N.E.2d at 379, 436
N.Y.S.2d at 864.
68. Id. at 176, 418 N.E.2d at 380-81, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 865-66. But cf. D'Onofrio
v. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200, 207, 365 A.2d 27, 30 (Ch. Div.) (fewer visits of
longer duration may better serve the child's welfare), afj'd per curiam, 144 N.J.
Super. 352, 365 A.2d 716 (App. Div. 1976). See supra text accompanying notes 1419. The court noted that the custodial mother's plans were made in good faith. 52
N.Y.2d at 176, 418 N.E.2d at 380, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 865. There was no indication that
she wished to jeopardize the child-father relationship by her relocation. Id. She had
also checked Las Vegas for a suitable home, school and place of religious instruction
for her child. Id.
69. Weber v. Weber, 84 A.D.2d 940, 940, 446 N.Y.S.2d 676, 677 (1981); Daghir
v. Daghir, 82 A.D.2d 191, 196, 441 N.Y.S.2d 494, 497 (1981), afJ'd, 56 N.Y.2d 938,
439 N.E.2d 324, 453 N.Y.S.2d 609 (1982); Becker v. Becker, 75 A.D.2d 814, 814, 427
N.Y.S.2d 492, 492 (1980); Milici v. Milici, 57 A.D.2d 946, 946, 395 N.Y.S.2d 90, 91
(1977).
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eral contexts in which "exceptional circumstances" may exist. For
example, the health or educational needs of the custodial parent or the
child may justify removal. The court in Deutsch v. Deutsch7 0 refused
to disturb a Family Court order that increased support for an infant
whom the mother had taken to Florida. 71 In view of the mother's
breast surgery and hysterectomy, and her hospitalization after a major
car accident, the court noted that the mother did not go to Florida "to
flee her creditors, to simply enjoy a vacation or to spite [the father]. ' 72 In Harris v. Harris,73 a custodial mother was allowed to
move with her children to Illinois, the location of the only university
in the country at which she could obtain a doctorate in language
pathology. 74 The court reasoned that the advanced degree would
promote the children's best interests because it promised the security
75
of greater income and eventual tenure for the mother.
As intimated by the Weiss court in dictum, "exceptional circumstances" may exist in other contexts as well. Removal may be justified
when the custodial parent receives "a unique, or even firm, vocational
offer,"' 76 or when the obligations of remarriage require a "dramatic
change of locale."'7 7 Lower courts, however, have narrowly construed this broad, imprecise language in Weiss.

70. 53 A.D.2d 861, 385 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1976), appealdenied, 40 N.Y.2d 808, 392
N.Y.S.2d 1026 (1977).
71. Id. at 861-62, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 357. The case, however, does not indicate how
removal was originally accomplished.
72. Id. at 862, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 357. For other cases that have discussed removal
in the context of health considerations, see Sipos v. Sipos, 73 A.D.2d 1055, 1056, 425
N.Y.S.2d 414, 416 (1980) (custodial parent's health); Nash v. Nash, 236 A.D. 89, 8990, 258 N.Y.S. 313, 313 (1932) (per curiam) (child's health), aff'd per curiam, 261
N.Y. 579, 185 N.E. 746 (1933); Denberg v. Denberg, 34 Misc. 2d 980, 986, 229
N.Y.S.2d 831, 837 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (custodial parent's or child's health); Whittemore
v. Whittemore, 202 Misc. 175, 178, 109 N.Y.S.2d 216, 219 (Sup. Ct. 1951) (same).
73. 57 Misc. 2d 672, 293 N.Y.S.2d 592 (Fam. Ct. 1968).
74. Id. at 674, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
75. Id. at 674-75, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 595-96. The court's belief that the best
interests of the child would be enhanced by the mother's obtaining a doctorate
underscores the court's recognition that the welfare of the child and custodial parent
are intertwined. See J. Wallerstein & J. Kelly, supra note 8, at 224-25. In allowing
removal, the court seemed to be influenced by the father's failure to exercise his
visitation rights as often as permitted under the divorce decree. 57 Misc. 2d at 677,
293 N.Y.S.2d at 597. It further noted that the move was a temporary one because the
mother would return to New York within three years. Id. at 677, 293 N.Y.S.2d at
598. The father would also be able to have the children with him for an extended
period during the summer. Id.
76. 52 N.Y.2d at 177, 418 N.E.2d at 381, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 866. The Weiss court
characterized the mother's proposed move as a search "for no more than an 'opportunity.' " Id.
77. id.
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For example, in Priebe v. Priebe,78 a custodial mother obtained
employment in Colorado because job opportunities in her field "were
severely limited in Buffalo. 17 9 The court held that her difficulties in
finding employment, without more, did not rise to the level of "exceptional circumstances" or a "pressing concern" for the welfare of the
custodial family unit that would warrant the disruption of weekly
visitation between the father and children. 0 The court indicated
that before it would permit removal, a custodial parent would have to
prove that "pressing financial concerns" necessitated a search for more
lucrative employment,"' and that such employment could not be
found either in the jurisdiction or in one whose proximity "would not
unduly interfere with visitation."' 8 2 Moreover, a custodial parent
would have to demonstrate that the former spouse could not or should
not pay increased child support to help alleviate financial difficuls3
ties.
In another case, Daghirv. Daghir,s4 the court would not permit a
custodial mother to move with her children to France so that she
could accompany her second husband, who had voluntarily accepted
a temporary job assignment for his company in that country.8 5 Testimony of the career manager of the second husband suggested that the
latter apparently accepted the position simply to enrich his portfolio,
as he stood to gain nothing by way of career or financial advancement.88 The court held that a move not dictated by compelling
financial or employment 7 considerations did not justify the curtailment of the children's frequent and regular visitation with their natu78. 81 A.D.2d 746, 438 N.Y.S.2d 413 (1981), afj'd, 55 N.Y.2d 997, 434 N.E.2d
708, 449 N.Y.S.2d 472 (1982).
79. Id. at 747, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 414.
80. Id.
81. Id; accord Daghir v. Daghir, 82 A.D.2d 191, 196, 441 N.Y.S.2d 494, 497
(1981), aff'd, 56 N.Y.2d 938, 439 N.E.2d 324, 453 N.Y.S.2d 609 (1982); Sipos v.
Sipos, 73 A.D.2d 1055, 1056, 425 N.Y.S.2d 414, 416 (1980); Strahl v. Strahl, 66
A.D.2d 571, 578, 414 N.Y.S.2d 184, 188 (1979), afJ'd, 49 N.Y.2d 1036, 407 N.E.2d
479, 429 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1980).
82. 81 A.D.2d at 747, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 414. Although the court did not define
"undue interference," the term would appear to refer to a relocation of the custodial
family unit at such a distance from the noncustodial parent as to frustrate frequent
and regular visitation.
83. Id.
84. 82 A.D.2d 191, 441 N.Y.S.2d 494 (1981), afJ'd, 56 N.Y.2d 938, 439 N.E.2d
324, 453 N.Y.S.2d 609 (1982).
85. Id. at 196, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 497.
86. Id. at 192-93, 196, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 495, 497.
87. This case indicates that a proposed move that would result in the second
spouse's career advancement may constitute a "compelling" employment consideration justifying removal. Id. Two prior New York cases actually permitted removal
when it was dictated by vocational circumstances beyond the second spouse's control.
In Cmaylo v. Cmaylo, 76 A.D.2d 898, 429 N.Y.S.2d 44, appeal dismissed, 51 N.Y.2d
770 (1980), a custodial mother was permitted to relocate with her child when her
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ral father. 8 In other words, the facts did not present a situation in
which the obligations of a remarriage legitimately required a "dramatic change of locale."'8 9
The New York test imposes a stringent burden of production upon
the custodial parent. A presently single or remarried custodial parent
must demonstrate that the desire to relocate with the child is dictated
by exceptional health, educational or financial considerations. A custodial parent whose desire to move is occasioned by the job transfer of
a second spouse must show that the transfer represents an employment
decision not within that spouse's control. 90
B. The New Jersey "Real Advantage" Test
New Jersey courts have placed on the custodial parent a burden of
production lighter than that imposed by New York courts. This lighter
burden, as demonstrated in D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio,91 results from
equating the best interests of the child with the best interests of the
new, post-divorce family unit of custodial parent and child. To determine if relocation to another jurisdiction would result in a "real
advantage" to the custodial parent and the child, 92 a court will examine the following factors: 1) whether the move has a "likely capacity"
second husband was involuntarily transferred to Texas by his company. Id. at 89899, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 45. Testimony indicated that if the second husband failed to
move he would lose his job. Id. at 899, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 45. In Martinez v. Konczewski, 7 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2322 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff'd as modified, 85 A.D.2d
717, 445 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1981), the court allowed a custodial mother to move with her
child to Florida, id. at 2324, where her second husband, a chiropractor, had opened
an office. Id. at 2322. Because of the "restrictive conditions" that existed in New York
with regard to the second husband's profession, and his inability to obtain employment there, the court reasoned that the second husband was being "forced" to move
to Florida. Id. at 2324 (analogizing spouse's predicament to that of the spouse in
Cmaylo). Thus, in New York, the only instances in which courts have permitted
removal of a child for "compelling" employment considerations of the custodial
parent's second spouse are those involving relocations not initially desired or sought
by that spouse.
88. 82 A.D.2d at 196, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 497. The court noted that the father's
ability to visit with his children in France was speculative at best, that there was no
guarantee of the return of the children to the jurisdiction once the mother's second
husband completed his assignment, and that the mother exhibited a lack of good
faith when she failed to inform the father of her impending move. Id. at 195-96, 441
N.Y.S.2d at 497.
89. See Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 177, 418 N.E.2d 377, 381, 436 N.Y.S.2d
862, 866 (1981).
90. See supra note 6 (noting similarity of California and Minnesota removal tests
to that of New York). For a discussion of the leading New York cases on removal, see
Meyer & Schlissel, Difficult Area for Judges-ChildCustody in Divorces, N.Y.L.J.,
Sept. 16, 1982, at 3, col. 1.
91. 144 N.J. Super. 200, 365 A.2d 27 (Ch. Div.), aff'd per curiam, 144 N.J.
Super. 352, 365 A.2d 716 (App. Div. 1976).
92. Id. at 206, 365 A.2d at 30.
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93
for improving the general quality of life of the custodial family unit;
2) whether the custodial parent is motivated to move primarily for the
purpose of defeating the other parent's visitation rights; 9 4 3) whether
the noncustodial parent is resisting removal principally to avoid an
increase in support obligations; 95 and 4) whether adequate substitute
visitation arrangements with which the custodial parent will comply
are available to foster the child's relationship with the noncustodial
parent.""
This "real advantage" test, with its pronounced emphasis on the
integrity of the new post-divorce family unit, 97 is premised on several
observations made by the D'Onofrio court. It recognized that a custodial parent is charged with the responsibility and obligation to provide the day-to-day care of the child and the environment in which he
will be raised. 98 The court also suggested that allowing a noncustodial
parent longer, yet fewer, uninterrupted visits might "serve the [parental] relationship better than the typical weekly visit which involves
little if any exercise of real [parental] responsibility." 99 Finally, the
court reasoned that a noncustodial parent's freedom to move from the
jurisdiction to seek a better life should be matched by a comparable

93. Id. In D'Onofrio, the custodial mother clearly satisfied this factor. In her
present employment, she barely earned enough to meet her family's needs and
received little assistance, financial or otherwise, from the noncustodial father in
rearing the children. Id. at 209, 365 A.2d at 31. Her proposed move would enable
her to accept an offer of employment in her field of training at a considerably higher
salary. Id. at 209-10, 365 A.2d at 31-32. Furthermore, she would be living near
relatives, who could help with the care of the children. Id. at 210, 365 A.2d at 32.
94. Id. at 206, 365 A.2d at 30. The noncustodial father had assumed only a
minimal role in raising the children despite the mother's attempts to include him in
that process. The mother's history of trying to facilitate the father's exercise of his
visitation rights convinced the court that her relocation was not inspired by a desire
to defeat visitation. Id. at 211, 365 A.2d at 32.
95. Id. at 206-07, 365 A.2d at 30.
96. Id. The court was satisfied that the alternative visitation arrangements were
adequate to maintain the child-father relationship. Id. at 211-12, 365 A.2d at 32-33.
Additionally, the court was confident that the custodial mother would comply with
the schedule of such visitation. Id. at 211, 365 A.2d at 32.
97. Id. at 205-06, 365 A.2d at 29-30.
98. Id. at 205-06, 365 A.2d at 29. The court's implication was that any decision
of a custodial parent concerning this responsibility should be given high priority.
99. Id. at 207, 365 A.2d at 30. The court appears to contradict a position it
adopted earlier in the opinion when it stated that "some variation of visitation on a
weekly basis is traditionally viewed as being most consistent with maintaining the
parental relationship" whenever the residence of the child and that of the noncustodial parent are close. Id. at 206, 365 A.2d at 30. If the court truly believed that less
frequent visitation would better serve the child's welfare, then it would have advocated such visitation even though the child and noncustodial parent live close to each
other. Even assuming that weekly visits involve, as the court stated, "little . ..
exercise of real [parental] responsibility," id. at 207, 365 A.2d at 30, from the child's
perspective they are crucial to his growth as a person. See supra text accompanying
notes 14-19.
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freedom of a custodial parent to seek a better life, both personally and
for the child, provided that substitute visitation is available.100
While a "real advantage" must be demonstrated under the New
Jersey test, the term is sufficiently vague so as not to require a showing
of "exceptional circumstances."''1 1 Although the custodial parent
must show that the proposed relocation would significantly improve
the well-being of the custodial family unit, credible evidence that a
job in a distant jurisdiction would involve a substantial increase in
salary may demonstrate a "real advantage" even though the custodial
parent is not faced with "pressing financial concerns."'10 2 Furthermore, before accepting a job offer outside of the jurisdiction, the
custodial parent need not try to find suitable employment in a nearby
jurisdiction
or seek increased child support from the noncustodial
03
parent. 1
C. The Illinois "Superficial Showing" Test
An Illinois appellate court recently devised a test that is even more
beneficial than the New Jersey test to the custodial parent seeking
court approval for removal. In In re Marriage of Burgham, 10 4 the
court started from the premise stressed in earlier Illinois decisions that
"the best interests of a child subject to a custody decree are usually
5
served by leaving the child with the existing custodial parent." 10 It
indicated that allowing removal may indirectly benefit the child because a custodial parent with10 6the freedom to move would be a happier
and better-adjusted parent.

According to the court in Burgham, a petitioning custodial parent's
burden of production is carried, and a prima facie case 0 7 is estab100. 144 N.J. Super. at 207-08, 365 A.2d at 30.
101. See supra text accompanying note 58.
102. The Appeals Court of Massachusetts adapted the "real advantage" test of
New Jersey to the facts before it in Hale v. Hale, 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 2117,
2122, 429 N.E.2d 340, 343 (1981). Unlike the proposed move in D'Onojrio, the move
in Hale would not result in greater financial benefit to the custodial parent. The
court, however, found that the "real advantage" of the move lay in its promoting the
emotional well-being of the custodial family unit. Id. at 2125, 429 N.E.2d at 345.
The court indicated that by enabling the custodial mother to pursue her career
choice, an emotionally stressful situation would be avoided. See id. As Hale demonstrates, the term "real advantage" is broad enough to encompass a situation in which
the primary reason for permitting a move would be to avoid forcing a stressful choice
between career ambition and family obligation.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 81-83.
104. 86 Ill. App. 3d 341, 408 N.E.2d 37 (1980).
105. Id. at 345, 408 N.E.2d at 40 (citing with approval Gallagher v. Gallagher, 60
Ill. App. 3d 26, 376 N.E.2d 279 (1978); Gray v. Gray, 57 Ill. App. 3d 1, 372 N.E.2d
909 (1978); Tandy v. Tandy, 42 Ill. App. 3d 87, 355 N.E.2d 585 (1976)).
106. 86 Ill. App. 3d at 345, 408 N.E.2d at 40.
107. A "prima facie" case consists of "certain selected elements which are regarded
as sufficient to entitle plaintiff to [prevail], if he proves them and unless defendant in
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lished, when: 1) a desire to remove the child from the jurisdiction is
stated; 2) a "sensible reason" for the prospective move is demonstrated; and 3) a "superficial showing" that the move is consistent
with the best interests of the child is made. 108
To satisfy the "superficial showing" aspect of the test, the custodial
parent does not have to prove that the move would directly benefit the
child because "a child often receives little, if any, demonstrable benefit from moving." 09 Rather, that parent has to show merely that the
move would not harm the child.1' 0
Once the custodial parent makes out a prima facie case, the burden
of producing evidence shifts to the noncustodial parent,'1 ' who may
then introduce evidence of specific damage that he or she believes is
likely to befall the child if removal is approved." 2 If the petitioning
parent succeeds in carrying the burden of persuasion,"13 the court
must still be satisfied that substitute
visitation is realistically possible
4
before it will permit removal."1
Under this removal test, the custodial parent never has the burden
of introducing evidence that an "exceptional circumstance" "5 or even
a "real advantage''11 prompted the desire to move. Allowing instead
proof that the child will not be harmed by the move effectively
relieves the custodial parent of the responsibility of demonstrating
17
that the move will promote the best interests of the child.'

turn establishes other elements which would offset them." Cleary, Presuming and
Pleading:An Essay on JuristicImmaturity, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 5, 7 (1959) (emphasis in
original) (footnote omitted).
108. 86 Ill. App. 3d at 345-46, 408 N.E.2d at 40. Once the court fashioned the
test, it did not attempt to apply it. Instead, it reversed and remanded the case for
further proceedings in the trial court. Id. at 347, 408 N.E.2d at 41.
109. Id. at 346, 408 N.E.2d at 40.
110. See id. (custodial parent "need not negate all possibilities of harm to the
child" that could result from the move).
111. See C. McCormick, supra note 5, § 342, at 803 n.26; 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence
in Trials at Common Law § 2494, at 379 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1981). The significance of the custodial parent's making out a prima facie case is that it eliminates the
risk of a directed verdict for the noncustodial parent. See id.
112. 86 Ill. App. 3d at 346, 408 N.E.2d at 40. The kind of evidence that the
noncustodial father in Burgham would have to produce was suggested in the court's
instruction to the trial court that it consider the effect on the best interests of the child
of the custodial mother's relationship with her male friend. Id. at 346, 408 N.E.2d at
41.
113. See supra note 5.
114. 86 Ill. App. 3d at 347, 408 N.E.2d at 41.
115. See supra text accompanying note 58.
116. See supra text accompanying note 92.
117. A showing that no detriment to the child would result from a move is not
equivalent to a demonstration that removal would be in the child's best interests.
Affirmative proof of specific benefits that would be generated by a move is necessary
to make the latter determination. In a later Illinois appellate court decision a variety
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D. The Colorado "Presumption"
The Colorado Court of Appeals in Bernick v. Bernick"8 has set
forth the most simply structured and least burdensome test yet developed by any state court confronting the removal issue. The noncustodial father in Bernick filed a motion requesting modification of the
divorce decree to prohibit the mother's planned removal of the children to a city 140 miles from the custodial residence in Denver. The
mother appealed the trial court's granting of the father's motion." 9
The appellate court reviewed the record, which disclosed that a law
firm in the distant city had offered a position to the mother, a lawyer,
and that the children desired to live with her there.120 The father's
sole assertion, which the court noted was supported by competent
evidence, was that the move would render visitation with his children
more difficult.' 2 ' The court recognized a custodial parent's responsibility to provide the children with the opportunity to visit the other
parent but deemed the decision of the mother to move consistent with
this responsibility because she did not attempt to remove the children
from the jurisdiction of the court. 122 At the same time, it also recognized a custodial parent's responsibility to select the environment in
which to raise the children. According to the court, decisions of a
custodial parent relative to this responsibility are entitled
to the en2 3
dorsement of the court that initially awarded custody.
With these considerations in mind, the court articulated its test:
"[I]n the absence of a clear showing to the contrary, decisions of the

of specific benefits was explored. See In re Feliciano, 103 Ill. App. 3d 666, 672, 431
N.E.2d 1120, 1125 (1981). Although the court in Feliciano fit its analysis into the
framework of the Burgham test, it required "some showing," rather than a "superficial showing," that the move would be consistent with the child's best interests. See
id. The court viewed the proposed move to Tennessee as being consistent with the
child's best interests because the custodial mother's second husband had secured
employment there and had purchased a home with the assistance of a grant program.
Id. The court also noted that the child was doing well in school, had made friends in
Tennessee, and was enjoying an improvement in his general health. Id.
118. 31 Colo. App. 485, 505 P.2d 14 (1972).
119. Id. at 486, 505 P.2d at 15.
120. Id. Courts have recognized that young children's preferences should be
treated with caution. See, e.g., Hale v. Hale, 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 2117,
2125, 429 N.E.2d 340, 345 (1981); Harris v. Harris, 57 Misc. 2d 672, 675, 293
N.Y.S.2d 592, 596 (Fam. Ct. 1968); Moran v. Moran, 200 N.W.2d 263, 269 (N.D.
1972); see also J. Wallerstein & J. Kelly, supra note 8, at 314 (pre-adolescent children
not reliable judges of their own best interests).
121. 31 Colo. App. at 486, 505 P.2d at 15.
122. Id, at 487, 505 P.2d at 15.
123. Id. See supra note 98 and accompanying text for discussion of similar observations by a New Jersey court in D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200, 365
A.2d 27 (Ch. Div.), aJf'd per curiam, 144 N.J. Super. 352, 365 A.2d 716 (App. Div.
1976).
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custodial parent reasonably made in a good faith attempt to fulfill the
responsibility imposed by the award of custody should be presumed to
have been made in the best interests of the children."' 2 4 Since no
and remanded with
contrary showing was made, the court reversed
25
directions to vacate the previous order.
The presumption126 in Bernick depends on proof of the basic fact
that the decision to move was "reasonably made in a good faith
attempt" to shape the children's environment. 2 7 While the custodial
parent has the burden of persuading the court that the basic fact
exists, 28 the petitioning noncustodial parent may try to rebut the
presumption by offering evidence to disprove the basic fact. 2 9 If the
noncustodial parent negates the other parent's contention of good
faith by demonstrating, for example, that the move is motivated
primarily by a desire to defeat visitation, then the use of the presumption should be discarded by the trier of fact. 30 Even if it cannot be
shown that the custodial parent acted in bad faith, the noncustodial
by proving that the
parent can still attempt to defeat the presumption
3
move would adversely affect the child.1 '
A presumption such as that created in Bernick strengthens the
impact of the evidence presented by the custodial parent: It predis-

124. 31 Colo. App. at 487-88, 505 P.2d at 15-16 (emphasis added).
125. Id. at 488, 505 P.2d at 16.
126. A presumption may be defined as a "standardized practice, under which
certain facts are held to call for uniform treatment with respect to their effect as
proof of other facts." C. McCormick, supra note 5, § 342, at 803. More specifically,
the term describes a rule that dictates that "the establishment of fact B is sufficient to
satisfy a party's burden of producing evidence with regard to fact A, [and that] at
least compels the shifting of the burden of producing evidence on the question to his
adversary." Id.
127. 31 Colo. App. at 488, 505 P.2d at 15-16. Translating the Colorado test into
the language of presumptions, if a party (the custodial parent) establishes the existence of the basic fact (good faith in desiring relocation), then a presumption arises as
to the existence of the presumed fact (relocation is in the best interest of the child). At
this juncture, the other party (the noncustodial parent) must introduce proof of the
nonexistence of the basic fact (custodial parent's good faith in desiring relocation) or
risk the direction of a verdict for the custodial parent. See C. McCormick, supra note
5, § 342, at 803.
128. See C. McCormick, supra note 5, § 342, at 803.
129. See Cleary, supra note 107, at 17.
130. See id.
131. See id. In this situation, the noncustodial parent would be attacking not the
fact from which the presumed fact is derived, but the presumed fact itself. The
evidence introduced in this direct attack may, among other possibilities, "lead the
trier to conclude that nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than [its]
existence." Id.; cf. Comment, The Best Interest of the Child Doctrine in Wisconsin
Custody Cases, 64 Marq. L. Rev. 343, 352 (1980) (criticism of use of presumption as
"judicial tiebreaker" when divorced parents introduce equally persuasive evidence in
custody dispute).
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poses the trier of fact to view the request to relocate more sympathetically than would the triers of fact in the previously discussed jurisdictions.
III. A PRoPosED "BEST INTRESTS" TEST
The "exceptional circumstances" test currently employed by the
New York courts represents the most effective effort so far of any
jurisdiction to serve the needs of the child of divorced parents. 32 By
requiring the custodial parent to demonstrate exceptional health, educational or financial considerations, a court is assured that that parent's reasons for moving are consistent with the promotion of the
child's best interests, and thus warrant a reduction in frequent and
33
regular visitation. 1
The two additional requirements that a divorced and presently
single parent must satisfy in New York when "pressing financial concerns" are urged 34 are also designed to protect the well-being of a
child enjoying frequent and regular contact with the noncustodial
parent. The first, that the custodial parent introduce competent proof
that "satisfactory employment" could not be obtained "in a location
which would not unduly interfere with visitation,"1 35 ensures that the
parent will make a good-faith job search in nearby jurisdictions. The
court requires this investigation in order to do all that is practically
possible to preserve the present visitation schedule for the benefit of
the child. In fairness to the custodial parent, however, the employment-search requirement must be reasonably limited. For example, if
a custodial parent residing in New York cannot find satisfactory employment there, that parent should not be expected to investigate,
before accepting an offer of employment in California, the job opportunities in every jurisdiction in geographical progression from the
custodial home in New York. Such a requirement, although implied
by the Priebe decision,136 could not have been intended. The custodial
parent should therefore be required to search for employment only in
those jurisdictions to which, if removal were permitted, weekly visits
would still be possible. If the custodial parent has canvassed these
jurisdictions without finding a job, there is little point in demonstrating lack of employment opportunities in the remaining jurisdictions
because relocation to any one of them would necessarily render a
weekly form of visitation impractical.

132.
133.
134.
135.
N.Y.2d
136.

See supra pt. II(A).
See supra text accompanying notes 69-75, 78-81.
See supra text accompanying note 81.
Priebe v. Priebe, 81 A.D.2d 746, 747, 438 N.Y.S.2d 413, 414 (1981), aff'd, 55
997, 434 N.E.2d 708, 449 N.Y.S.2d 472 (1982).
See id.
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The second requirement of the New York test is that the custodial
parent show that the former spouse is not able to pay more child
support.137 If the spouse can provide additional support, the custodial parent's need to obtain employment in another jurisdiction may
be obviated and weekly visitation maintained. This requirement,
however, should not be a part of any "best interests" test. It not only
demeans the custodial parent by virtually forcing that parent "to go
begging" for more money, but it also may frustrate a career choice to
which that parent, like anyone else, is entitled. 3 Sufficient protection would be given to the welfare of the child by other aspects of an
"exceptional circumstances" test modeled on the New York test without imposing this second requirement.
While New York courts place a heavy burden of production on a
presently single custodial parent who must relocate for exceptional
financial reasons, they are considerably more sympathetic to a custodial parent whose move is occasioned by the involuntary job transfer
of a second spouse. In the latter instance, the custodial parent does not
have to prove that the spouse could not find employment in a jurisdiction conducive to the natural parent's exercise of visitation rights. 39
Not applying the employment-search requirement in the context of an
involuntary job transfer is sensible: Compelling the second spouse to
demand a transfer to an available but less distant post may cause the
loss of present employment or a future promotion. Such a result would
not benefit the child, whose welfare depends in1 40many respects on the
earning capacity of his parent's second spouse.
Similarly the custodial parent, regardless of marital status, should not
have to satisfy the employment-search requirement with respect to an involuntary job transfer. Although there is no reported case in New York in
which a custodial parent has been transferred by an employer, New
York courts would presumably relax the requirement in such a case.
When the relocation of a second spouse is prompted instead by
exceptional financial considerations, the employment-search requirement should be retained. Failure to apply it when the spouse loses
nothing by investigating job opportunities in neighboring jurisdictions
would set up a double standard: Custodial parents whose second

137. Id.
138. A custodial parent should be free to take advantage of economic opportunities that arise. Gray v. Gray, 57 Ill. App. 3d 1, 6, 372 N.E.2d 909, 913 (1978);
Pattison v. Pattison, 208 So. 2d 395, 396 (La. Ct. App. 1968), cited with approval in
In re Marriage of Lower, 269 N.W.2d 822, 826 (Iowa 1978) (en bane).
139. See Cmaylo v. Cmaylo, 76 A.D.2d 898, 898-99, 429 N.Y.S.2d 44, 45, appeal

dismnissed, 51 N.Y.2d 770 (1980).

140. For similar reasons, the employment-search requirement should not be applied to require a custodial parent's second spouse, involuntarily transferred by a
branch of the armed services, to seek first an assignment to a post closer to the
noncustodial parent's residence.
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spouses are seeking more remunerative employment would be given
an unjustifiable preference over single custodial parents who are trying to obtain such employment.
CONCLUSION

The application to any removal case of an "exceptional circumstances" test, fashioned after the New York test, assures a trier of fact
that the best interests of the child will receive sufficient protection.
Satisfaction of its requirements by the custodial parent guarantees
that that parent has legitimate reasons for moving, that the child will
gain substantial benefits from the move and that frequent and regular
visitation, so crucial to the child's development, is being reduced for
only justifiable reasons. The jurisdictions of New Jersey, Illinois and
Colorado, by requiring the custodial parent to satisfy a lighter burden
of production, fail to consider as carefully the welfare of the child.
Their tests permit interference with frequent and regular visitation
without adequately ensuring that removal will "better serve" the
welfare of the child than continued residency in the jurisdiction in
which the noncustodial parent lives and exercises such visitation.
I
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